Question: How will 2007 be remembered in its broad outlines?

Soylemez: 2007 was for Turkey a year, first and foremost, of elections. As with many domestic issues, foreign policy issues were mostly overshadowed by the multiple elections in 2007. All the energies were burnt out and spent mostly in the domestic front. Thus, no new major initiatives on the chronic issues within the purview of Turkish Foreign Policy were taken. However, this is not to say that 2007 was a lost year with regards to foreign policy too. On the contrary, Turkey continued to assert itself as a major regional player, especially in the Middle East. When one looks back at the events of 2007, to be fair and objective, there are pluses and minuses in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy issues. The issues have become more complex with every passing year, more complicated with developments on the international scene. One thing is clear, that Turkey's foreign policy is becoming more and more active, in fact proactive in many instances, more multidimensional in its multiple avenues and approaches, more specialized and perhaps less traditional or conservative in its broad outlines, in a general characterization, if you like.

Question: Which were the main foreign policy issues of Turkey in 2007?

Soylemez: Foreign policy issues, or problems, do not change from one day to the next. Many of these issues persisted and continued with little or no change in their substance.

Question: Can you be more specific?

Soylemez: Four main problems remain, as before, the vestige of previous years. These are firstly the Cyprus problem, secondly the negotiations with the European Union for full membership, thirdly the issue of terrorism with particular emphasis on the PKK and lastly the Armenian genocide allegations. All of these were transposed to the MFA agenda of 2007 within a generally defensive strategy, with little or no solution in mind but with crisis management tactics.

Question: But is it not true that no problem is without a solution, as they say?

Soylemez: In theory or in principle, it is true that no problem is without a solution. But it is also true that certain solutions for certain questions take longer to simmer, sometimes ages, to mature and be ready to be solved.

None of these four main problematic areas in Turkish foreign policy was ready for a solution, even in part. As they say, it takes two to tango, a determination to solve, to have the will.

Question: Do you mean to say Turkey has the will to solve and the confronting parties do not?

Soylemez: To be fair, it is difficult to apportion complete blame on one side or the other in any given issue. Do the parties want a solution, or is it to their advantage not to solve the problem? With regards to Cyprus, though, the case is different. More specifically, did the Greek Cypriot side want a solution in 2007? If they wanted a solution, they would not have rejected the Annan Plan earlier. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey showed their sincerity and willingness when the KKTC voted a resounding yes to the Annan Plan. Here it is obvious which side was to blame. In 2007 the stalemate continued on the Cyprus problem. Mr Papadopoulos paid lip service to a peaceful solution but wholly on Greek Cypriot terms. So it was yet another lost year where the Cyprus problem was concerned. Indeed, the Cyprus problem was put aside by the UN, EU etc. and did not occupy any urgency on the international agenda, which was a minus.

Question: Was there any hope for any rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia over the genocide allegations?

Soylemez: The Armenian side, to pressure Turkey, brought their "genocide" claim to the US Congress once again and with unparalleled force. They were able to secure passage of a resolution at the committee stage, in spite of Turkey's rightful and factual de fence, which was a miss for Turkey. But the Diaspora failed to bring the issue to the floor of Congress due to mounting opposition from Turkey and the issue was shelved thanks to better understanding of the matter in all its complexities and strategic thinking by some Representatives in the House. That was a clear plus for Turkey. So it was an initial minus followed by a strong plus. No political will existed to address the main problem. In the Armenian mind in 2007 Turkey should recognize the Genocide Claim, cede land to Armenia, accept to pay compensation for what happened in 1915 to Armenian Ottomans, according to the Armenian Constitution and Declaration of Independence. Turkey's proposal to establish a joint committee of historians to look into what happened during the years of the First World War, first brought forth in 2005, remained on the table. This initiative is even supported by the French President, the anti-Turkey Sarkozy, who is a most ardent supporter of the French Armenians. Turkey's continued efforts for a rapprochement with Armenia was a plus. On the other hand, the dastardly assassination of Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was a minus for Turkey's image at home and abroad, like the killing of the Italian priest in Trabzon, the missionaries in Malatya and recently the stabbing of another Italian priest in Izmir. These were all minuses with their differing international ramifications. But it would appear that the resolution in the US House of Representatives, a perennial thorn in the side of Turkey-US relations, has encountered a resounding defeat this time and will likely not rear its head any time soon. This clearly was a silent victory for Turkish Foreign Policy, a significant plus of note.

Question: It is obvious that there was a lull in Turkey's EU membership negotiations in 2007, but which side was to blame for that?

Soylemez: Turkey was blamed in 2006 for not opening its airports and seaports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. So Turkey was punished and 8 chapters were suspended in the membership negotiations which was a big minus. The repercussions of this unfortunate and unjust decision continued to be felt in 2007. In 2007, largely due to election dynamics in Turkey, political and other reforms slowed to a halt and this was reflected in the EU Commission's annual progress report on Turkey. Ultimately, due in large part to the changed French position under Mr. Sarkozy who outright opposes Turkey's membership to the EU, two key words were dropped in December at the EU Summit Declaration: "membership" and "accession". This was another minus in Turkey's relations with the EU, though two more chapters were opened so as not to discourage Turkey any further, bringing the tally to 5, which is a plus. But on the whole, the image of the EU is sliding fast in Turkish public opinion, which is a minus. Turkey is losing heart and enthusiasm on its quest for EU membership and the accession process will likely run into more complications due to French and Greek Cypriot intransigence. That is a minus which may be welcomed by the anti-Turkey lobby within the EU which is hoping that Turkey will throw in the towel and give up its EU quest, which Turkey will not do. The Erdogan government is downplaying the humiliating, undeserved, unfair and discouraging blows suffered, which is ostensibly a plus. The effects of this policy can be evaluated only in hindsight, maybe at next year's end.

Question: Was not the military action at the year's end against PKK terrorism a big plus?

Soylemez: Turkish diplomacy had prepared the ground, to ward off international adverse reactions, in de fence of Turkey, which led to the limited military operation against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq where they find refuge. A big plus is deserved by both the MFA and the Turkish Armed Forces. It was a minus that Turkey has lost so many of its soldiers and officers fighting on the PKK front. The PKK had exhausted Turkey's patience. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's White House encounter with President Bush was a success in renewing confidence and support between Turkey and the United States which had suffered since the 2003 March 1 motion in Parliament. The Washington DC visit to President Bush was a big plus as it laid the groundwork for the military operations against the PKK.

Question: How did Turkish foreign policy fare in the Middle East in 2007?

Soylemez: On the whole it was quite positive. Full marks that the planned Kirkuk referendum was postponed, a definite plus. The Istanbul Meeting of the enlarged format of the neighboring countries of Iraq, a process which Turkey pioneered, in November was modestly successful though inconclusive. Moreover, Turkey's participation in the Annapolis meeting on the Middle East Peace Process was a plus. Turkey's diplomatic efforts to bring in Saudi Arabia, and especially Syria, to Annapolis was another plus. Turkey's behind-the-scenes endeavors with regards to Iran, Syria-US relations and in the fragile Lebanon situation were all plusses of varying degrees.

Question: What were the results of changing of the guard at the top within the MFA after the 22 July elections and the subsequent election of Abdullah Gul as President?

Soylemez: After four years as a successful and experienced Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul left his seat to Minister Ali Babacan, a young and energetic workaholic with a strong background in economic relations, which was a big plus. The MFA is in the hands of a trusted friend of President Gul and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, which is a plus in favor of the MFA and may mean that the Ministry's importance and influence may gain ground as Babacan is part of the triumvirate.

To have a President with a foreign affairs background promises to be a big plus for Turkey's diplomacy abroad as was already evident in the second half of 2007 with President Gul taking an active interest with his extensive experience of the issues involved.

To have as Undersecretary, number two at the Foreign Ministry, the hugely experienced Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, an indispensable expert on the Cyprus problem, past and present, as a diplomat who spent more than a decade spanning two tours in there, a trusted, able, soft spoken and dedicated diplomat, a man of conciliation in a world of confrontation, is a definite plus for Turkish Foreign Policy.

Question: So Ankara has continued to be a popular venue for international diplomacy in 2007?

Soylemez: Yes, indeed it has. Kings, presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs and other ministers of all kinds plus their delegations were on official or working visits to Ankara, and some like Prince Charles on private visits. King Saud, Jordan's King Abdullah, the presidents of Syria, Macedonia, Slovakia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Prime Ministers of Iraq, Qatar, Ethiopia, Italy were among those who came during 2007. The number of international meetings in Ankara and Istanbul as preferred locations were pluses in Turkey's international image, like the Conference of the Least Developed countries in Istanbul, the Islamic Conference meeting which are just two examples, the Summit of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Also, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was once again confirmed and recognized by the Islamic Conference which is a plus.

The Turkey-Greece natural gas pipeline is a plus, as was the visit of Ali Babacan and the growing rapprochement with Greece. The efforts to bring EXPO 2015 to Izmir in 2015 have gained momentum. Turkey's Security Council membership candidature for the term 2008-09 is also virtually assured due to the many initiatives undertaken by Turkish diplomacy abroad, another important plus.

With all the pluses and minuses, in the final analysis and in my opinion, Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007 was overshadowed by the election process but nevertheless Turkey continued to make its presence increasingly felt in the international arena in many diverse areas, while working to create the positive ground on which some of its major foreign policy challenges - like Cyprus and the EU - can be addressed in 2008.